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FEDERAL ESTATE TAX ON INCOME ACCRUING
AFTER DEATH
KATHERINE H. JOHNSON*
p RIOR to the enactment of Section 302(j) of the Revenue
act of 1926, as added by Section 202(a) of the Revenue
Act of 1935,1 neither the statutory law nor Treasury regula-
tions interpretative thereof required the inclusion in the gross
estate owned by a decedent on the date of death of income
accruing to the estate after the decedent's death for the pur-
pose of determining the federal estate tax. Nor does Section
302(j) appear to require the inclusion of such income in the
gross estate.
2
Since Section 302(j) deals only with the date of the valu-
ation of the gross estate, one may question how "all the prop-
erty included therein on the date of the decedent's death" can
include, by virtue of Section 302(j), after-accrued income
which was never owned by the decedent. Yet Article 11 oi
U. S. Treasury Regulations 80,1 purporting to interpret the
section, requires the inclusion of such income; and the inter-
pretation has been upheld by the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York in Saks v. Higgins,4
a case of first impression, in an opinion rendered October
27, 1939.
Article 11 begins by stating:
In general, the object of subdivision (j) of section 302 is to make
provision whereby the amount of tax otherwise payable may be lessened
Member of Illinois Bar; alumna of Chicago-Kent College of Law.
1 Section 811(j), I.R.C.
2 "(j) Optional Valuation-If the executor so elects upon his return (if filed
within the time prescribed by law or prescribed by the Commissioner in pur-
suance of law), the value of the gross estate shall be determined by valuing all
the property included therein on the date of the decedent's death as of the date
one year after the decedent's death, except that (1) property included in the
gross estate on the date of death and, within one year after the decedent's death,
distributed . . . shall be included at its value as of the time of such distribution
. . . instead of its value as of the date one year after the decedent's death, and
(2) any interest or estate which is affected by mere lapse of time shall be
included at its value as of the time of death . . . with adjustment for any
difference in its value as of the later date not due to mere lapse of time. ...
In case of an election ... any bequest, legacy, devise, or transfer . . enumerated
therein shall be valued as of the date of decedent's death with adjustment .. .
8 1937 ed. 4 29 F. Supp. 996 (1939).
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when, within the year following the decedent's death, the gross estate
has suffered a shrinkage in its aggregate value.
If the decedent died after August 30, 1935, the executor may by an
election upon his return, . . . have the property which was included in
the gross estate on the date of the decedent's death valued as of the
applicable dates, as follows:
(1) ..
(2) Any property not distributed, sold, exchanged, or otherwise dis-
posed of within such 1-year period, valued as of the date one year after
the date of the decedent's death ....
Before examining following portions of the article in or-
der to determine why, in view of the language, "property...
on the date of death," income accrued to the estate after
the decedent's death is subject to estate tax, several points
should be noted.
First, the federal estate tax law does not define value,
nor prescribe how it shall be determined, except as it refers
to "fair market value," where transfers for insufficient con-
sideration are involved.5 The determination was left to be
prescribed by regulations of the Treasury Department.6
Secondly, the prescribed method for determining the
value of the gross estate for estate tax purposes is found in
Article 10 of U. S. Treasury Regulations 80, where it is stated
in part:
Valuation of Property.-(a) General.-The value of every item of
property includible in the gross estate is the fair market value thereof
at the time of the decedent's death; or, if the executor elects in accord-
ance with the provisions of article 11, 7 it is the fair market value thereof
at the date therein prescribed or such value adjusted as therein set
forth. The fair market value is the price at which the property would
change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being
under any compulsion to buy or to sell.
Thirdly, Section 302(j) refers to only three valuation
dates. They are: the date one year after the decedent's
death, as to property not distributed, sold, exchanged, or
otherwise disposed of within one year after death; the date
of distribution, as to property distributed, sold, exchanged,
or otherwise disposed of (whichever first occurs) within one
5 Section 302(i), Rev. Act of 1926.
6 Brooks v. Willcuts, 78 F. (2d) 270 (1935).
7 The election would seerm to be made pursuant to Section 302(j) rather than
to Article 11 of Regulations 80.
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year after death; and the date of death, (a) as to an interest
or estate which is affected by the mere lapse of time, and
(b) as to transfers for public, charitable, or religious uses,
the value of both being subject to adjustment; and they relate
to the property included in the gross estate on the date of the
decedent's death.
It is, therefore, clear that under Section 302(j) property
included in the gross estate on the date of the decedent's
death which is not of a kind affected by the mere lapse of
time, nor is deductible as a transfer for public, charitable, or
religious uses, should be valued as of the date one year after
the decedent's death, or as of date of distribution, if dis-
posed of within the year following death, if the optional valu-
ation date is selected, and, under Article 10, the value should
be determined, in general, by the application of the fair-mar-
ket-value test.
How, then, can property included in the gross estate on
the date of the decedent's death (as, for example, real
estate, bonds, and corporate stock) include therein rents, in-
terest, and dividends which have accrued to the estate after
the decedent's death? The language of Article 11 is not specif-
ic enough to state with certainty the answer to this question.
However, certain deductions may be drawn from the follow-
ing pertinent parts of the article:
The property to be valued as of one year after the date of decedent's
death, or as of date of decedent's death, or as of some intermediate date,
is the property included in the gross estate on the date of the decedent's
death. As property and its value are separate and distinct . . . it will
be necessary in every case first to determine what property constituted
the gross estate at decedent's death. ...
Interest-bearing obligations, such as bonds and notes, embody two
promises, one to pay principal and the other to pay interest, and both
promises are a part of the gross estate at the death of the decedent,
if the obligation was then owned by him .... If the valuation date is sub-
sequent to death, the principal and interest then accrued and unpaid
are to be valued as of that date. The valuation date of any part pay-
ment of principal or of any installment of interest, made between de-
cedent's death and the date as at which the obligation is to be valued,
will be the date of such payment. Like rules will govern, so far as
applicable, when any other obligation is involved, as, for example,
one calling for the payment of rent or a royalty. Thus, in the case of
rent, if the realty and the obligation to pay the rent reserved were
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parts of the gross estate at the time of decedent's death, the value of
the former must be determined as of the applicable valuation date,
and also the value of the rent then accrued and unpaid reserved by
the latter. The valuation date of any rent paid in the interim pursuant
to the rental obligation will be the date of its payment ...
When corporate stock is a part of the gross estate at decedent's
death, and a dividend in partial liquidation is thereafter paid on or before
the date as of which the stock is to be valued, the valuation date
of such dividend will be the date of its payment. Similarly, a dividend
paid within the same period out of earnings, whether the earnings are
made or accumulated prior or subsequent to decedent's death, will be
valued as of the date of its payment ....
In every case where the election is exercised, the return . . must
set forth . . . (3) the value of each item of property determined in
accordance with the provisions of subdivision (j). The amount of any
income accrued and unpaid at the date of the decedent's death on
each item of principal, the amount of any income collected or otherwise
realized thereon after the decedent's death and prior to the date as of
which the item of principal is to be valued, and the amount of any
income accrued and unpaid thereon at such subsequent valuation date,
shall be separately shown.
It should be noted that Article 10, covering valuation of
property, states that, in the case of stocks and bonds, fair
market value is the mean between the highest and lowest
quoted selling price on the valuation date, if the stocks and
bonds are listed upon a stock exchange, or the mean be-
tween the highest and lowest selling price on the valuation
date if the securities are not listed upon an exchange. If the
value of a security cannot be determined by representative
sales, or from bid and asked price, then the fair market
value is to be arrived at by giving consideration to the sound-
ness of the security, interest yield, date of maturity, and
other relevant factors in the case of bonds, and to the com-
pany's net worth, earning power, dividend-paying capacity,
and other relevant factors in the case of shares of stock.
The valuation of an interest in a business in which the de-
cedent was interested is stated to be equal to the amount
which a willing purchaser would pay therefor to a willing
seller in view of the net assets, including good will, and
demonstrated earning capacity of the business. Any prop-
erty not specifically treated by a subdivision is to be valued
in accordance with the fair-market principle of subdivision
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(a). Rules for determining the value of annuities, life, re-
mainder, and reversionary interests make use of tables of
applicable factors to be used in reckoning the value of future
payments. One example given is that of an annuity which
entitled the decedent to $1000 annually in installments of $500
for a term certain. At the death of the annuitant there re-
mained twenty payments to be made over a period of ten
years. By reference to the table of factors the value of this
annuity was determined to be $8,258.51. In other words, fu-
ture payments for a term certain are to be discounted upon
the basis of compound interest at the rate of 4 per cent a
year.
There is in Article 10 no reference to the method by which
a promise to pay interest, or a right to future profits or rent,
shall be valued, for there is no reference to the divisibility of
property for valuation purposes into rights to principal and
rights to income. On the contrary, the implication is clear
that stock exchange quotations or selling prices, where avail-
able, of a bond or a share of stock, reflect the value of the
promise to pay interest embodied in a bond and the right to
future dividends which may be declared on the stock.
Article 11, as we have seen, does not discuss either what
property constituted a gross estate of a decedent on the date
of his death' or rules for determining the value of such prop-
erty. Article 11 is concerned with the date as of which such
property shall be valued, if the executor elects to value the
estate in accordance with the provisions of Section 302(j). Al-
though the section grants but one valuation date, namely, the
date one year after death, for property not disposed of within
the year following death, and but one date, namely, date of
distribution, for property which is disposed of within the
year following death, Article 11 adds date of payment, and
date of accrual, as the proper valuation dates for interest,
rents and dividends accrued after the decedent's death and
prior to the date as of which the obligation or principal is to
be valued. Here is the crux of the whole matter, for by this
extension of the clear language of Section 302(j), Article 11
effectively requires interest, rents and dividends accrued to
s It refers to subdivisions of Section 302, as amended, other than subdivision
(j), as supplying the information necessary to that determination.
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the estate after death of the decedent to be valued, and, thus,
necessarily considers them part of the gross estate owned
by the decedent on the date of his death. Yet, there can be no
such devious enlargement of the gross estate where the exec-
utor elects to value it as of the date of the decedent's death,
since, in such case, date of death and date as of which the
item of principal is to be valued are identical, and no interim
wherein income may be earned exists.
The inclusion in the gross estate of income accruing to the
estate of a decedent after the death of the decedent is ac-
complished, we may conclude, by (1) conceiving property
as capable of divisibility for valuation purposes into principal
rights and income rights, and applying the theory to the
property of a gross estate owned by a decedent at death
where the executor elects to value it under the optional valu-
ation date granted by section 302(j); (2) requiring a valuation
date for the income right, which is, in fact, date of payment
or accrual of income accrued to the estate after death and
prior to the valuation date of the item of principal, (the latter
being valued either as of date of distribution, if distributed
within one year following death, or date one year after death),
although there is no ground for this requirement in Section
302(j) nor from the intent of Congress as drawn from the
Conference Report9 on the bill; (3) requiring the value of the
principal right to be, apparently, the fair market value of
the property on the valuation date, and the value of the in-
come right to be equivalent to the amount of income realized
from the property after death and prior to the valuation date
of the item of principal.
The reason for our first conclusion is that the reference
to the divisibility of income-producing property into a prom-
ise to pay principal and a promise to pay interest, and the ex-
tension of the theory to real estate and rents, and stock and
dividends, appears only in Article 11. A study of opinions of
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the Board of Tax
Appeals, and judicial decisions has revealed no prior in-
stances where, when the entire interest was owned by one
person, it has been deemed necessary to so divide property
9 H.R. Rep. No. 1885, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935), 9.
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for the purpose of determining its value for income tax, gift
tax, or estate tax.
Our second conclusion follows from the express language
of Article 11. As stated above, neither date of payment nor
date of accrual is mentioned in Section 302(j). Furthermore,
the example given in the conference report, supra, indicates,
it is believed, that income is not a factor to be considered in
valuing a gross estate pursuant to the election granted by
Section 302(j). The hypothetical gross estate set up in the
conference report consisted of cash, real estate, foreign
bonds, domestic bonds, and corporate stock and was valued
as of date of death and also pursuant to the provisions of the
section. It completely ignored any valuation or date of valua-
tion for income earned after death, even though the foreign
bonds were stated to have matured and been paid in full
within the year after death. And there is, of course, no justifi-
cation, even if it be conceded that the value of a principal
right can be separated from the value of an income right, for
valuing the two rights as of different dates.
A startling provision of Article 11 is the method, as stated
in our third conclusion, required for valuing the income right.
We may ask why the fair market value of the item of prin-
cipal does not reflect the value of the income right, unless by
"the item of principal" is meant the property minus its in-
come-producing factor. It can scarcely be contended that de-
faulted bonds, stocks which have passed dividends, and un-
desirable realty, do not have these facts reflected in their
fair market value or in the price they fetchect in representa-
tive sales. If such factors which affect value are removed by
actual payment of income during the year following death,
the fair market value on the date one year after death will
ordinarily show an increase over the fair market value on the
date of death. From a theoretical point of view it is possible
to conceive of the valuation of the principal right of certain
types of property apart from the valuation of the income right
of the same property, but both valuations should be as of the
same time, and the two values together, that is, what a will-
ing buyer would pay a willing seller for the principal right
alone, and what a willing buyer would pay a willing seller for
the income right alone, should not exceed what we are ac-
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customed to understand is meant by fair market value. By
way of illustrating the operation of Section 302(j), Article 11
gives an example valuing a gross estate both as of the date
of death and as pursuant to the election. Therein we find an
item of corporate stock valued at $200,000 on the date of
death. It was distributed to the legatee eleven months after
death and its value at that time was $100,000. A cash dividend
of $100,000 was paid on this stock seven months after death
and that amount was included in the value of the gross estate
pursuant to the election, making the value of the stock $200,-
000 when valued as of date of death, and $200,000, if the divi-
dend is included, when valued as of the date of distribution.
How is the value of $100,000, as of date of distribution, de-
termined? The example gives no explanation. Is it the price
a willing buyer would have paid a willing seller therefor on
such date? If so, does it include or exclude the value of the
right to future dividends declared subsequent to the date of
distribution? If it is fair market value of the stock, including
the value of the so-called income right, it is curious that the
stock decreased in value 50 per cent in the eleven months
since death, since a dividend (which was not described as a
liquidating dividend), equal to 50 per cent of the value of the
stock on date of death was paid seven months thereafter. If
the value of $100,000 on date of distribution is the fair market
value excluding the right to future dividends, are we to as-
sume that the proper way to value stock under the require-
ments of Article 11 is to determine first what a willing buyer
would pay a willing seller for the right to share proportion-
ately with other owners in the assets of the corporation if and
when the corporation is dissolved, and then to determine
the amount a willing buyer would pay a willing seller for the
right to share in future dividends? If so, the problems of ex-
ecutors in valuing corporate stock when the optional valua-
tion date is selected will hardly warrant the election of the
privilege granted by Section 302(j). And, finally, if the $100,000
valuation of the stock on the date of distribution is not fair
market value, how was it determined? Possibly it was fair
market value less the amount of the dividend paid since date
of death. In such case fair market value on the date of dis-
tribution must have been $200,000, since the amount of the
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dividend was $100,000. This is curious too, since, in ordinary
cases, fair market value is usually more than twice the
amount of the last dividend; and the example given was not
stated to be extraordinary nor involving a liquidating divi-
dend. At least, it is unlikely that had the decedent died eleven
months later than the date of death stated in the hypothetical
example, and his executor had valued his gross estate as of
date of death, the commissioner would readily have accepted
a valuation of $200,000 on stock which four months before had
paid a dividend of $100,000. In any event, there seems to be no
reason why the stock should not have been valued at $200,000
on the date of distribution, if that was its fair market value on
that date, rather than at $100,000 and the amount of the divi-
dend listed separately.
The purpose of dealing at such length with the example
given in Article 11 of the valuation of corporate stock under
the provisions of Section 302(j) is not to indicate that the
hypothetical figures used were selected with the view of justi-
fying the inclusion in the gross estate of income earned after
death, but to show that the example does not make clear how
corporate stock should be valued. Since the figures used in
the commissioner's example appear in columns headed
"Value at valuation date," and "Value at date of death," in
lieu of any special definition of the word value, we conclude
that value means fair market value in both instances; and
since fair market value as of date of death would assuredly
mean the value of both the income right and the principal
right, so it must mean the same as of valuation date. The
only alternative is to assume that value at valuation date
means the value of the principal right only, which, as we
have indicated, is an unreasonable assumption since what a
buyer of stock is generally buying is future earnings.
In the case of bonds, although the principal sum, the
rate of interest, and the period to maturity, be certain, ap-
parently the value of the promise to pay the principal sum is
not discounted at prevailing interest rates, and the value of
the promise to pay the interest on the principal sum deter-
mined by discount factors comparable to those in effect in
valuing an annuity for a term certain; on the contrary the
value of the principal sum of a bond or note is, presumably,
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what a willing buyer would pay a willing seller for the bond or
the note, and the value of the promise to pay interest is what-
ever amount of interest accrued or was paid during a rel-
atively short period prior to the date as of which the promise
to pay the principal sum is to be valued. Thus, if two interest
payments accrue or are paid within a year after death, the
promise to pay interest would have two valuation dates; if an
interest payment accrues but is not paid during the same
period, the value of the promise to pay interest under the reg-
ulations would be equivalent to the amount of interest in de-
fault. Can it be said with any reasonableness that the price
which a willing buyer would pay a willing seller for a promise
to pay $10 a year for ten years is $10? And that the price which
a willing buyer would pay a willing seller for a promise to
pay $200 ten years hence is $200?
Since the income right of an interest in property has not
heretofore been valued for tax purposes apart from the prin-
cipal right of the same property, no case has been found rul-
ing on the propriety of so evaluating the property of a gross
estate, prior to the promulgations of Article 11, and the Saks
case, supra. At the time of the enactment of the first estate
tax law the question of the government's right to include in
the gross estate income earned during administration and
appreciation during that period, was presented by the Sec-
retary of the Treasury to the Attorney General who replied,
that, since the tax was not upon the property but upon the
transfer of the estate, the answer was that there was no
authority under the act to include in the gross estate income
earned after death." Apparently the question has not arisen
during the intervening years until the present instance.
An attempt was made in Bull v. United States,1' a lead-
ing case, to subject to both estate tax and income tax profits
received by the estate of a decedent resulting from a partner-
ship agreement whereby the estate of a partner was to share
in partnership profits and losses during the year following
the death of the partner in the same proportion that he would
have shared in if alive. The government contended that as
the agreement gave Bull a valuable right which passed to his
estate at his death, the commissioner correctly included its
10 31 Opin. A. G. 64 (1916). 11 295 U.S. 247, 55 S. ct. 695, 79 L. Ed. 1421 (1935).
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value for estate tax purposes (as well, of course, as taxing
profits received after death as income to the estate for estate
income tax) and that, since the right to profits is distinct
from the profits actually collected, the court could not say
more than that perhaps the commissioner had put too high a
value on the contract right when he valued it as equal to the
amount of profits received during the year following the part-
ner's death.
The court, however, did say more. It said that there was
no justification for the commissioner's rulings; that the iden-
tical money was the basis of two assessments; that there was
no justification for characterizing the right of a living partner
to his share of earnings as part of his capital, and if the right
was not capital to him, it could not be capital to his estate;
and that there was no estate tax due in respect of the sum
paid to the executor as profits for the period subsequent to
death. The Bull case has been followed in a similar situation
where the profits were received from a personal-service part-
nership, 2 and also where they were received, presumably as
a result of a capital investment, from a cotton brokerage
partnership. 3
That the court in the Bull case was dealing with a theory
similar to that which furnishes the basis for the requirements
of Article 11 is made clear by a statement of the court therein.
It said that it thought that, had Bull during his lifetime, with
his partners' consent, assigned his interest in the firm to a
third person, the commissioner would have objected to Bull
capitalizing the right to profits thus assigned, deducting its
value from the consideration received, and returning the dif-
ference only as gain. The court stated it thought in such a
case the commissioner would rightly have insisted that Bull
return the entire amount received as income.
Of course, income received by the estate during the year
following death, which, under Article 11, is part of the gross
estate upon which the estate tax is based, is also subject to
estate income tax and it was suggested by the court in the
Saks case, supra, that the objection on the grounds of double
taxation should not be made to the requirement of Article 11,
12 Darcy v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 66 F. (2d) 581 (1933).
13 Degener v. Anderson, 77 F. (2d) 859 (1935).
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since income accrued but unpaid at date of death is subject
to both income tax and estate tax.
Apparently the court, by this observation, failed to con-
sider the principle underlying the imposition of the estate tax.
Conceivably the greater part of a gross estate of a decedent
might consist of income which he had accumulated before his
death and upon which he had paid income tax. But this fact
would hardly serve to justify the exclusion of this income
from the property which, by virtue of statute, may be trans-
ferred by reason of the death of the owner. It is the privilege
of transfer which is the subject of the estate tax, the amount
of the tax being measured by the value of the property which
is transferred. Certainly no one would want his right to have
his property transferred after his death limited to such prop-
erty as upon which he had not been required to pay an in-
come tax. It is proper to schedule income accrued but unpaid
at the death of the owner upon the decedent's final income
return, since the decedent in his lifetime had a power of dis-
posal over it; and it is equally proper to permit such income
to be transferred after death and thus be a part of the gross
estate which, because it is transferred, furnishes the basis
for the estate tax. But it is quite a different thing to place in-
come accrued to the decedent's estate in the same class as in-
come accrued to the decedent while he was alive, and to
reason that the former should be part of the gross estate sub-
ject to estate tax just as is the latter. Death is the generating
source from which the authority to impose an estate tax takes
its being, and necessarily death is the factor which ends the
accumulation of property upon the value of which the estate
tax is based. It is well settled that income is taxable to the
person to whom it belongs. Income accrued to the estate after
death is not taxable to the decedent, for a dead man owns
nothing. It should be equally well settled that income accrued
to the estate after death is not property owned at death
though it is realized from property owned at death. Article 11
in a sense recognizes this fact, for if property owned at death
is sold by the executor and reinvested in property which pro-
duces an income during the year following death, such in-
come is not considered part of the gross estate of the decedent
on the date of his death.
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The promulgators of Article 11, and the court in the Saks
case, seem to have reasoned that if property transferred at
death is capable of producing income, then there is a right to
future income which is transferred at death. If this point be
conceded, it follows that it must be valued for estate tax pur-
poses, not only where the gross estate is valued under the
optional valuation date, but also where it is valued as of the
date of death. Such a right to future income should also be
valued when it is transferred as a gift, when it was part of the
property of the gross estate of a prior decedent upon which
estate tax had been paid, when it was sold with a capital gain
or loss. Such, however, is not the case. And it is believed that
the reason why it is not is that a right to future income can
be valued only by permitting "mere speculation and conjec-
ture to become a guide for the ascertainment of value-a
thing to be condemned in business transactions as well as in
judicial ascertainment of truth."14
Article 11, 'in requiring the return of income realized or
collected between date of death and valuation date, in effect
states that the value of the promise which it requires to be
valued is the amount of income realized. It is this method of
determining the value of the right or promise to future in-
come which is the gist of the matter, for past, actual, gain for
a definite period determines the value of a future, possible,
gain for an indefinite period.
The real question is whether income actually realized
during the year following death should be included in the
gross estate of a decedent, either as property existing on the
date of death, or as the value of property existing on the date
of death. Article 11 answers the question affirmatively-in-
come accruing to the estate after death should be included in
the gross estate as the value of property existing on the date
of death. Inasmuch as, under the requirements of Article 11,
the right to future income is property existing on the date of
death but it has no separate value if no income is realized
therefrom during the brief stated period, one is led to believe
that the result of the requirements of Article 11 is the taxation
of income accruing to the estate after death, rather than the
14 Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246 at 257, 54 S. Ct. 704, 78 L. Ed. 1236 at
1245 (1934).
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valuation of the income-producing factor of property existing
on the date of death.
In view of the fact that the estate tax is a transfer tax on
the right of having property transferred upon the owner's
death, and that since the enactment of the first estate tax law
no attempt has heretofore been made to include in the prop-
erty transferred at death income accruing to the estate after
death; and in view of the fact that Section 302(j) furnishes no
basis for including such income in the gross estate owned at
death; and in view of the fact that it is alone Article 11 which
requires the inclusion of such income in the gross estate, and
this because it requires, where the executor elects the option-
al valuation date granted by the section, that the income
right of property owned at death shall be separately valued
but does not indicate whether the principal right of such prop-
erty is also to be separately valued; therefore, it is submit-
ted that Article 11 insofar as it requires the inclusion in the
gross estate of a decedent for estate tax purposes of income
accruing to the estate after the decedent's death, is an arbi-
trary and capricious construction of a clear and unambigu-
ous statute, and should be held by the courts to be invalid.
